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the proceeds of a bankrupt estate, but, as was suggested in the Review, 0 the
rationale of the decision applied with equal force to the settlement of a stockholder derivative suit. Indeed the argument is even stronger in a derivative
suit since the plaintiff in such a suit admittedly brings his action on behalf of
others whereas the preferred stockholders in the Young case had appealed only
as individuals.
In the instant case the New York Court of Appeals has applied the rule in
Young v. Higbee to a stockholder derivative suit. The rule will serve to deter
the strike suitor, whose principal objective is a lucrative personal settlement,
and yet it will not decrease the incentive for bona fide derivative suits, since in
the latter situation the plaintiff intends the corporation as a whole to recover
the proceeds of the suit in excess of the costs of litigation. It has been suggested
that the application of the rule will result in settlements in which the price paid
for discontinuance takes the form of attorneys' fees rather than direct payments
to the plaintiff.- A requirement of court approval would tend to insure the reasonableness of such fees. The related problem of settlement before a complaint
is filed is more troublesome. In addition to the difficulty of obtaining proof, it
may be argued that the instant case would not extend to such a situation since
the imposition of the fiduciary duty here is based upon the plaintiffs' domination of the course of litigation. And yet by agreeing to a pre-litigation settlement for a sum in excess of his pro rata interest the plaintiff is necessarily acting
in a representative capacity. In the words of the New York Court of Appeals,
"a fundamental principle inherent in the representative relation"12 should require him to account for his stewardship.'3
Evidence-Authentication of Documents-Business Entry Rule-Unsigned
Rent Order Not Admissible Solely on Authentication by OPA Attorney[Nebraska].-The defendant landlord petitioned the regional Office of Price
Administration in Omaha for an increase in maximum rent to compensate for
improvements made on the premises. Subsequently, he increased the rent on the
plaintiff tenant's apartment to $32.50 per month. The plaintiff, after paying
that rent for four months, brought suit to recover penal damages for alleged
rental overcharges. To prove that the rent could not be lawfully increased without an order of the regional rent director, the plaintiff offered in evidence a
printed pamphlet containing the rent regulations of the OPA. To prove the
10Application of the Rule of Young v. Higbee Co. to Stockholder Derivative Suits, i3
Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 321 (1946).
" Ibid., at 33'.
12 Clarke v. Greenberg, 71 N.E. 2d 443, 445 (N.Y., 1947).
13 The New York rule, permitting the plaintiff in a stockholder derivative suit to discontinue the suit at will so long as other stockholders have not intervened, note 2, supra, seems
inconsistent with the trend indicated by the instant case. Legislative enactment of an effective version of Federal Rule 23 (c) seems necessary.
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amount of the rent ceiling for the apartment, he offered two other documents:
a typewritten order on the official form purporting to increase the maximum
rent to $30 per month and bearing the typewritten signature of the rent director, and the original registration certificate for the apartment, on which had
been typed two endorsements showing that the maximum monthly rent had
been twice changed by order of the rent director, first to $23, later to $3o.The
assistant rent attorney for the area attempted to authenticate all three documents, testifying that the latter two were prepared in the normal routine of the
Omaha office. The trial court admitted the three documents in evidence, and
the jury found for the plaintiff. On appeal, held, the admission of the order and
the registration certificate without sufficient authentication is reversible error.
Powell v. Anderson.x
Although the appellate court rejected the assistant rent attorney's authentication of the OPA rent regulations, it took judicial notice of them.2 It was thus
established that the landlord could not lawfully increase the rent until he had
petitioned the OPA and received an order from the OPA rent director granting
the increase.3 Since the defendant had testified at the trial that he had increased the rent to $32.50 on the oral advice of a rent inspector and had denied
having received an order from the rent director, he had admitted the absence
of justification for the increase.4 Accordingly, under the OPA rent regulations
and the Emergency Price Control Act, the court could have held the defendant
liable for at least $25 per overcharge, even if the plaintiff had offered no additional evidences The appellate court, however, ruled on the admissibility ques(Neb., 1946).
is well established that courts may take judicial notice of the regulations of federal
agencies. Brown v. Lederer, 140 F. 2d 136 (C.C.A. 7th, i944); Milk v. Mulcahey, 13o N.J.L.
325, 32 A. 2d 598 (i943); 222 East Chestnut Street Corp. v. Murphy, 325 Ill. App. 392, 60
N.E. 2d 450 (1945); Epstein v. Brook, 23 N.J. Misc. 267, 43 A. 2d 782 (1945); Weatherford v.
Coffin, 187 S.W. 2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App., 1945); Kerr v. Congel, 46 N.Y.S. 2d 932, x81 Misc.
461 (1944).
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2It

io Fed. Register 3436 (1945), especially Subsec. 2 (a) of § i388.i1s.
reliance on the unofficial statements of a rent inspector without having received a
rent increase order is not a sufficient excuse for failure to follow the established procedure is
well settled. Wells Lamont Corp. v. Bowles, 149 F. 2d 364 (Em. App., 1945); Bowles v. Sago,
65F. Supp. 178 (Pa., 1946); Bowles v. Alexander, 65 F. Supp. 892 (Pa., X946); Bowles v.
Vance, 64 F. Supp. 647 (Pa., 1946); Bowles v. Hageal, 64 F. Supp. 294 (Pa., x946).
5The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 provides: "If any person selling a commodity
violates a regulation, order, or price schedule prescribing a maximum price or maximum
prices, the person who buys such commodity for use or consumption other than in the course
of trade or business may, within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation,
except as hereinafter provided, bring an action against the seller on account of the overcharge.
In such action, the seller shall be liable for. . . . whichever of the following sums is the greater:
(i) Such amount not more than three times the amount of the overcharge, or the overcharges,
....as the court in its discretion may determine, or (2) an amount not less than $25 nor
more than $5o, as the court in its discretion may determine: Provided, however, That such
amount shall be the amount of the overcharge or overcharges or $25, whichever is greater, if
the defendant proves that the violation of the regulation, order, or price schedule in question
was neither wilfull nor the result of failure to take practical precautions against the occurrence
3

4 That
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tions as if the substantive law required that the plaintiff prove the amount of
the overcharge in order to establish the defendant's liability.
In refusing to admit the maximum rent order and the registration certificate
containing the endorsements, the appellate court declared the testimony of the
assistant rent attorney incompetent and the documents incapable of proving
themselves.6 About the rent order the court said, "An unsigned and unauthenticated copy of an order, produced from the files of a governmental agency, is
secondary evidence which, of itself, raises no presumption that the original was
in fact executed. The original order in this case was not accounted for, nor was
there any proof of its actual issuance or execution."7 About the endorsements
it added, "From the standpoint of establishing that the orders referred to therein were in fact made as recited, these endorsements have the same deficiencies
[as the order] .... in that they are not authenticated or identified in any manner, other than the conclusion of the witness .... as to what the document
contained, and his statement that the exhibit as a whole was a part of the official record. These endorsements are unsigned and unidentified and are not, of
themselves, proof that the orders therein referred to were in fact isstied by the
rent director .....

",8

The rejection of the order increasing maximum rent lumps together two objections to the document; that it was a copy and therefore secondary evidence,
and that it was unauthenticated. Because it is improbable that a carbon duplicate will suffer from the wilful or inadvertent errors in transcription to which a
copy is subject, most courts have recognized a distinction between them. Carbon
duplicates are necessarily exact transcriptions, and therefore, admissible as
primary evidence. 9 In a few jurisdictions a distinction is drawn between signed
and unsigned duplicates.'- This distinction is significant where a signature is
essential to the binding character of a document and is considered part of its
contents, but when original documents are valid without a written signature it
is apparent that the signature is added primarily for purposes of authenticaof the violation ..... the payment or receipt of rent for defense-area housing accommodations
shall be deemed the buying or selling of a commodity, .... and the word 'overcharge' shall
mean the amount by which the consideration exceeds the applicable maximum price." 56
Stat. 23 (942), 50 U.S.C.A. App. §925 (e) (i944).
6 25 N.W. 2d 4oi, 4o3-4 (Neb., 1946).
7 Ibid.

8Ibid., at 404.
Window Glass Co. v. Pierce, 87 Kan. 548, 125 Pac. io8 (1912); Humes v. Humes,
56 Cal. App. 2d 126, 133 P. 2d 39 (1942); United States v. Manton, 107 F. 2d 834 (C.C.A. 2d,
1938); Anglo-Texas Oil Co. v. Manatt, i25 Okla. 92, 256 Pac. 740 (X926); Massachusetts
Bonding and Ins. Co. v. State, 84 Ind. App. 303, 149 N.E. 377 (1925); People v. Munday,
28o Ill. 32, 117 N.E. 286 (1917); Goodman v. Saperstein, 115 Md. 678, 8i Atl. 695 (91);
Wright v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co., 118 Mo. App. 392, 94 S.W. 55 (i9o6). Contra: Mauritz
v. Schwind, oI S.W. 2d 1085 (Tex. Civ. App., 1937); Wentworth v. Chapman, 141 Me. 35,
38 A. 2d 563 (r944); Lockwood v. L. & L. Freight Lines, Inc., 126 Fla. 474,171 So. 236 (936).
10Brenner v. Lesher, 332 Pa. 522, 2 A. 2d 731 (1938); R. D. Burnett Cigar Co. v. Art Wall
Paper Co., 64 Ala. 547, 51 So. 263 (i909).
9Cbanute
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tion.I The duplicate maximum rent order in the instant case falls within the
latter category, and consequently, although unsigned, should be considered
not secondary, but primary evidence, admissible if sufficiently authenticated.
The court's dictum, labeling the order a copy and thus secondary evidence, is
therefore contrary to the decisions in analagous situations in most jurisdictions.
The holding of the court, on the other hand, that the order was improperly
authenticated, is in accord with the great weight of authority at common law
and reveals the appalling rigidity and inadequacy of common law precedents
in dealing with routine business transactions. Both the rent order and the
registration certificate were on official form documents, available only to qualified OPA officials. They were taken from the files of the Omaha office, and they
were identified by a witness, who, in his daily work, was in continual and intimate contact with those files. The court's naked conclusion that neither document could be sufficiently authenticated by the assistant rent attorney, questioning as it does the reliability of an impartial administrative agency and its
responsible representative, appears to reject authentication that common sense
would accept. Only one other rental overcharge case has been found in which
the reliability of a particular order was mentioned, and there the Emergency
Court of Appeals took judicial notice of the ordery An interview with the chief
rent attorney of the Chicago OPA office disclosed that that office customarily
sends an assistant rent attorney into court with such documents, and has often
sent only a stenographer. The same official explains that the procedure in the
instant case in filing an unsigned order and sending a signed duplicate original
to the landlord departed from the standard procedure prescribed for the OPA
offices, which requires the signature on the office original of the rent director, or
of a representative designated by him.
Probably defendant's counsel in the instant case was moved to attack the
rent order, when it was offered in evidence, because it lacked a signature. However, the Chicago rent attorney stated that neither the signed orders nor the
unsigned endorsements of that office had ever been questioned, whether authenticated by an assistant rent attorney or by a stenographer. Thus the decision
in the instant case is hostile to an authentication which has been unquestioned
in many cases; nevertheless, it is not in conflict with the decisions of most
courts under the common law whenever objections have been raised to documents offered in evidence under similar circumstances.
At common law in analagous situations a writing may be proved by testimonial evidence, but the witness must have been present when the document
was executed, 3 or must have personal knowledge of the handwriting or signa" See Notes:

23

Mich. L. Rev. 536

(1925); ii

Minn. L. Rev. 469 (1927); ig Harv. L. Rev.

123 (190).

"Safeway Stores, Inc., v. Brown, 138 F. 2d 278 (Em. App., 1943), cert. den.

(1943).
3 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 2131 (1940).

320

U.S. 797

RECENT CASES
ture of the writer.4 Such documents are also admissible if they have been kept
in official custody, but such custody is limited to that of a public officer whose
primary task is to keep special documents and who can authenticate certified
copies for the court.-s Official documents may prove themselves, but only in
limited cases and when under official seal.' 6 The rent order in the instant case
could not satisfy these rules of admissibility strictly applied.
The endorsements faced even greater obstacles. They were hearsay evidence
of the rent order. At common law the endorsements might have been admissible under the exception to the hearsay rule for entries made in the regular
course of business, but only if authenticated by the clerk or stenographer who
made the entry.' 7 To require for admission that each endorsement be followed
by the signature of the rent director would involve an impossible sacrifice of
administrative efficiency, since the numerous endorsements are entered by
clerks in the office routine. That such narrow rules of admissibility for such
entries are not necessary and are so unadaptable to the accounting and clerical
systems of modem officies as to make authentication financially or administratively impracticable, has received widespread recbgnition.'8 Most experts agree
that the failure of the common law in this field must be rectified by legislation,
and several "model" statutes have been proposed. 9
X4 2

Jones, Evidence §545 (1938).

16 Ibid., §§ 2161-2169.
2158-2159 (1940).
has compelled acceptance of less complete authentication where the entrant
has died, gone insane, or left the jurisdiction of the court. Morgan et. al., The Law of Evidence

1"7 Wigmore, Evidence §§
17 Necessity

53-54 (r927).
18

Ibid., ch. 5. Massachusetts Bonding &Ins. Co. v. Ncrwich Pharmacal Co., 18 F. 2d 934,

937 (C.C.A. 2d, 1927); Borucki v. MacKenzie Bros. Co., Inc., 125 Conn. 92, 3 A. 2d 224
(1938); Palmer v. Hoffmann, 318 U.S. 1o9, 111-12 (1943); Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124,
126-29, 17o N.E. 517, 518 (930); 5 Wigmore, Evidence, §§ 1518, 1520 (194o); Lehman,

Technical Rules of Evidence, 26 Col. L. Rev. 5o9, 518 (1926); Business Entries before the
Court, 32 Ill. L. Rev. 334 (1937). A few courts have substantially liberalized the rule by judicial decision. See the series of cases in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals: The Spica, 289
Fed. 436 (C.C.A. 2d, 1923); Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 297 Fed. 791 (C.C.A. 2d,
1924); Massachusetts Bonding &Ins. Co. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., i8 F. 2d 9 34 (C.C.A. 2d,
1927). It is probable that the documents in the instant case would have been admissible in
that court. But despite Judge Hand's assertion in the last case, at 937, that "It is a matter ....
where the intervention of the legislature, which must be by general rules, cannot be as satisfactory as a step by step progress of the courts, if they are willing to progress at all," the imperceptible progress of most courts has caused the Commonwealth Committee to conclude,
" .... the process of reaching this proper end by judicial decision is altogether too slow and
uncertain." Morgan, op. cit. supra note 17, at 63.
x9Of these the "Uniform Act" of the Committee on Evidence of the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has been most widely adopted. It provides that "a
record of an act, condition, or event shall, in so far as relevant, be competent evidence if the
custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation,
and if it was made in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition or
event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of information, method and time of
preparation were such as to justify its admission." 9 U.L.A. 263 (1942). See Morgan, op. cit.
supra note 17, at 63; Business Entries before the Court, 32 Ill. L. Rev. 334,352 (1937).
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Courts which have applied statutes based on these proposals for reform have
admitted a wide range of writings on the strength of no more satisfactory authentication than was offered in the principal case. In Harperv. U.S., 2 ° the prevailing flexible approach under the statutes was set forth. The court said of the
federal statute 2 ' "The'purpose and effect of this statute is to make admissible
any writingif made in the regular course of any business without the strict proof
of authenticity which had theretofore been required."-2 In the Harpercase the
writings included invoices, analysis sheets, letters received and written by the
company, and copies of checks it had issued. All were admitted when an officer
of the company, who was the custodian of the documents, testified that they
were writings executed in the regular course of business. Hospital records have
been consistently admitted upon proof that they came from the hospital and
were made in the regular course of business23 Reports of federal and state
agencies,4 and business records of every kind2S are admitted under similar circumstances. The proof usually required is that a witness familiar with the
routine of the office testify that the writings have come from a recognized business or agency, and that they were made and filed in the regular course of business. ,Under such a statute it would be difficult to object to the sufficiency of the
authentication of the documents in the instant case; for they were official forms,
they came from the files of the OPA office, they were executed in a routine procedure, and they were authenticated by a witness who was familiar with the
office routine and the files.
The contrast which the case reveals between the common law and statutory
requirements for admissibility of writings made in the regular course of business underlines the need for statutory reform in those states (the majority)
where the common law requirements still prevail. To satisfy the Nebraska
court it might have been necessary that the rent director authenticate the unsigned order, or that the stenographers who made the notations testify that
they remembered entering the endorsements. While the Omaha office could
2o 143 F. 2d

795 (C.C.A. 8th, i944).

2149 Stat. i56I (1936), 28 U.S.C.A. § 695 (Supp., 1946).
Harper v. United States,

143

F. 2d 795, 8o6 (C.C.A. 8th, i944). Italics added.

23Mcflowd v. Pig'n Whistle Corp., 26 Cal. 2d 696, i6o P. 2d 797 (i045); Um v. MooreMcCormack Lines,.Inc., 115 F. 2d 492 (C.C.A. 2d, 1940); 144 A.L.R. 731 (i943).
24 E. K. Hardison Seed Co. v. Jones, 149 F. 2d 252 (C.C.A. 6th, 1945); Borucki v. MacKenzie Bros. Co., 125 Conn. 92, 3 A. 2d 224 (1938).
2S E.g., Dias v. Farm Bureau Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Columbus, Ohio,
55 F. 2d 788 (C.C.A.
4 th, 1946) (Post Office forms); Landay v. United States, io8 F. 2d 698 (C.C.A. 6th, 1939)
(books of corporations); People v. Richardson, x69 P. 2d 44 (Cal. App., 1946) (employee's
time card); H. F. Shepherdson Co. v. Central Fire Ins. Co. of Baltimore, 22o Minn. 401, 19
N.W. 2d 772 (i945) (loose-leaf ledger sheets); Arques v. National Superior Co., 67 Cal. App.
2d 763, 155 P. 2d 643 (1945) (shipwright's book of entries); Doyle v. Chief Oil Co., 64 Cal.
App. 2d 284, 148 P. 2d 915 (1944) (oil well reports, records, and invoices); Davidson v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 152 Pa. Super. 63, 31 A. 2d 58 (1943) (home office insurance
record).

RECENT CASES

probably have avoided this difficulty by preserving the signed original order in
the office files according to the procedure established for the OPA offices, the
procedure it did follow was a common business practice. The standards imposed
by the Nebraska court in this case will place formidable administrative burdens
on the Omaha OPA office when it attempts to enforce either its own claims or
those of aggrieved tenants arising out of OPA orders issued prior to the instant
case. One might speculate that, even in the absence of a modem business records
statute, an appellate court more sympathetic to the OPA might have found
little difficulty in upholding the trial court in this case.

Evidence-Confessions-Coerced Confession May Be Suppressed before
Indictment-[Federal].-Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested the petitioners on the authority of a warrant issued on information and
belief that the petitioners, jointly engaged in business, were knowingly in
possession of goods stolen in foreign commerce. With the consent of one of the
petitioners, who was the manager of the business, the agents searched the premises and seized certain documents. The petitioners were then taken to the United
States Courthouse, where they were questioned individually by relays of federal
agents. Continuous interrogation, ranging from six to eleven hours, elicited confessions from the petitioners. Before the grand jury took any action, a motion
was made for the suppression of the documents and confessions on the ground
that they had been obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
The district judge refused to suppress the douments on the ground that consent
had cured what was otherwise an illegal search and seizure;' he refused to consider the suppression of the confessions on the ground that precedent bars such
relief before trial.2 On appeal to the circuit court of appeals, held, a confession
obtained in violation of constitutional rights may be suppressed before indictment. Order as to confessions reversed, one judge dissenting. In re Fried.3
judge Augustus Hand, dissenting, stated that the desirability of preventing
indictments based on incompetent confessions was outweighed by the necessity
of not unduly burdening law enforcement offidals with frequent pre-indictment
and pre-trial determinations. judge Frank, concurring in the holding, added
that illegally obtained confessions should be suppressed before indictment re' A complaint based on information -and belief will not support a lawful arrest. Go-Bart
Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1930); United States v. Pollack, 64 F. Supp. 554 (N.J.,
1946); United States v. McCunn, 4o F. 2d 295 (N.Y., 1930); United States ex rel. King v.
Gokey, 32 F. 2d 793 (N.Y., 1929).
2No prior case has been found concerning suppression of a confession before indictment.
The holding of the district court was based on cases where suppression was unsuccessfully
sought after indictment but before trial. United States v. Lydecker, 275 Fed. 976 (D.C. N.Y.,
1921); Kokenes v. State, 213 Ind. 476, 13 N.E. 2d 524 (1938); People v. Nentarz, 142 Misc.
477, 254 N.Y. Supp. 574 (i93I) ; People v. Reed, 333 Iii. 39 7, 164 N.E. 847 (1928).
3 16I F. 2d 453 (C.C.A. 2d, 1947).

